一次三個泡泡
Three Bubbles at Once
一次三個泡泡
Jim Rickards 2021/06/07
Dear Reader,
親愛的讀者，
If you’ve ever wondered why you can’t get a straight answer from the Federal Reserve, you’re not alone. And you’re not imagining it.
如果您曾經想知道為什麼不能從美聯儲那裡得到直接答复，那麼您並不孤單。而你並沒有發揮想像。
Beginning with Paul Volcker in the early 1980s and continuing with Alan Greenspan in the 1990s and early 2000s, Fed officials developed a new language called “Fedspeak.”
從 1980 年代初的保羅沃爾克開始，到 1990 年代和 2000 年代初的艾倫格林斯潘，美聯儲官員開發了一種新語言，稱為“聯準說” (“Fedspeak.”)。
Fed governors and chairmen frequently have to testify before Congress, give speeches or do media interviews. They know they have to say something that seems to have substance and is technically correct.
美聯儲理事和主席經常需要在國會作證、發表演講或接受媒體採訪。他們知道他們必須說一些似乎有實質內容並且在技術上是正確的。
On the other hand, they often don’t want to disclose what they actually intend or what they see behind the scenes. Either that or they really don’t know what they’re doing and can’t let people know that.
另一方面，他們通常不想透露他們的實際意圖或他們在幕後看到的內容。要么是那樣，要么他們真的不知道自己在做什麼，也不能讓人們知道。
The way to reconcile these public appearances with as little transparency as possible is to use Fedspeak.
以盡可能低的透明度來調和這些公開露面的方法是使用Fedspeak。
Fedspeak consists of an artful blend of platitudes and jargon that intends to sound intelligent but actually says nothing.
Fedspeak 巧妙地混合了陳詞濫調和行話，聽起來很聰明，但實際上什麼也沒說。
Fedspeak is both confused and confusing. And that’s the point.
Fedspeak既困惑又令人困惑。這就是重點。
Paul Volcker used to practice Fedspeak behind a cloud of smoke from his huge cigar, back when you could smoke indoors. Alan Greenspan later captured the essence of Fedspeak when he testified to Congress, “If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”
保羅沃爾克過去常常在他巨大的雪茄冒出的煙霧後面練習聯邦演講，那時你可以在室內吸煙。艾倫·格林斯潘後來在向國會作證時抓住了 Fedspeak 的精髓，“如果我對你來說似乎過於清楚，你一定誤解了我的話。”
Another bit of candor was when Greenspan said, “We really can’t forecast all that well, and yet we pretend that we can, but we really can’t.” (It’s a mystery to me why many people actually place credence in their forecasts).
另一種坦率是格林斯潘說：“我們真的不能預測那麼好，但我們假裝可以，但我們真的不能。”（對我來說，為什麼許多人真的相信他們的預測是個謎）。
Fedspeak may have been invented by Volcker and Greenspan, but it’s alive and well today. The latest example comes from Fed Vice Chairman Randy Quarles while testifying before Congress on the possibility of inflation due to Fed policies of zero rates and huge asset purchases.
Fedspeak 可能是由沃爾克和格林斯潘發明的，但它在今天仍然有效。最新的例子來自美聯儲副主席蘭迪·誇爾斯 (Randy Quarles)，他在國會作證時指出，由於美聯儲的零利率和巨額資產購買政策可能導致通脹。
Quarles first says, “I don’t want to overstate my concern” about inflation, and adds that he does not expect a breakout. He then pivots and says, “If my expectations about…inflation…are borne out…and especially if they come in strong…it will become important…to begin discussing our plans to adjust the pace of asset purchases.”
誇爾斯首先說，“我不想誇大我對通脹的擔憂”，並補充說他預計不會出現大爆發。然後他轉過頭來說：“如果我對……通貨膨脹的預期……得到證實……尤其是如果它們變得強勁……這將變得很重要……開始討論我們調整資產購買步伐的計劃。”
In other words, we may be getting close to a new “taper” and a possible taper tantrum. So, which is it? Inflation or no inflation? Quarles says both and, therefore, really says nothing of substance.
換句話說，我們可能正在接近一個新的“減低購買”和一個可能的縮表恐慌。那麼，它是哪個？通貨膨脹還是不通貨膨脹？ Quarles 兩者都說了，因此，實際上什麼也沒說。
A perfect example of Fedspeak.
又是Fedspeak 的一個完美例子。
What is clear is that the Fed has become a serial bubble machine that has dangerously distorted the entire financial system through constant intervention, which greatly increased during the pandemic.
顯而易見的是，美聯儲已經成為一個連續的泡沫機器，通過不斷的干預，危險地扭曲了整個金融體系，在大流行期間大大增加了。
Right now, it has created not one, not two, but three simultaneous bubbles. What are they? And how much longer can they last before imploding? Read on.
現在，它創造的不是一個，不是兩個，而是三個同時出現的泡沫。這些是什麼？它們在爆炸之前還能持續多久？繼續閱讀。
The Fed’s Inflated Three Simultaneous Bubbles
美聯儲同時膨脹的三個泡沫
I don’t hold many mainstream economists in high regard. They mostly cling to obsolete or defective models (such as random walk, efficient markets hypothesis, Phillips Curve, wealth effect, and many more). They are also impervious to contrary data, alternative models, and common sense.
我對許多主流經濟學家的評價並不高。他們大多堅持過時或有缺陷的模型（例如隨機遊走、有效市場假設、菲利普斯曲線、財富效應等等）。它們也不受相反數據、替代模型和常識的影響。
But, one of the few mainstream economists whose work I follow closely is Robert Shiller, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2013.
但是，我密切關注工作的少數主流經濟學家之一是 2013 年諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者羅伯特·席勒 (Robert Shiller)。
Shiller is a true pragmatist. He develops models that reflect reality rather than creating abstract models and forcing data to fit some preconceived and erroneous curve. He has also developed metrics such as the Case-Shiller home price index and the CAPE Ratio to track price movements and potential bubbles in key asset classes.
席勒是一位真正的實用主義者。他開發反映現實的模型，而不是創建抽像模型並強迫數據擬合一些先入為主的錯誤曲線。他還開發了 Case-Shiller 房價指數和 CAPE 比率等指標，以跟踪關鍵資產類別的價格走勢和潛在泡沫。
And right now, Shiller is issuing one of his most dramatic warnings ever...
而現在，席勒發出了他有史以來最具戲劇性的警告之一……
Shiller is warning that stocks, housing and cryptos may all be in extreme bubbles at the same time.
席勒警告說，股票、房地產和加密貨幣可能同時處於極度泡沫之中。
Shiller uses data series that go back over 100 years in some cases, so he has a deep perspective on business cycles and prior bubbles on which to base his forecast. Savvy investors are well-advised to follow Shiller and be alert to his warnings.
在某些情況下，席勒使用可以追溯到 100 多年前的數據系列，因此他對商業周期和之前的泡沫有著深刻的見解，以此作為他的預測的基礎。明智的投資者最好跟隨席勒並警惕他的警告。
There’s no doubt that U.S. stock markets are in bubble territory.
毫無疑問，美國股市處於泡沫區域。
One of the best metrics in terms of predictive analytic power is the Shiller Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio, known as the CAPE Ratio.
就預測分析能力而言，最好的指標之一是席勒週期性調整市盈率，稱為 CAPE 比率。
The CAPE Ratio uses a price-to-earnings ratio (PE ratio) similar to many other PE ratios in use. The main difference is that the CAPE Ratio uses earnings per share (EPS) averaged over ten years and adjusted for inflation.
CAPE 比率使用的市盈率（PE 比率）與使用的許多其他市盈率相似。主要區別在於 CAPE 比率使用的是過去十年的平均每股收益 (EPS)，並根據通貨膨脹進行了調整。
These adjustments smooth out earnings through an entire business cycle (with a ten-year average) and present real earnings (with the inflation adjustment).
這些調整使整個商業周期的收益（十年平均值）平滑並呈現實際收益（通貨膨脹調整）。
The all-time high CAPE Ratio was 44.19 in December 1999 at the peak of the dot-com bubble. The ratio was 30.0 immediately prior to the historic stock market crash of October 1929.
1999 年 12 月互聯網泡沫達到頂峰時，CAPE 比率創下歷史新高的 44.19。在 1929 年 10 月曆史性股市崩盤之前，該比率為 30.0。
Today the ratio is about 37.0, the second-highest in history; higher than it was before the crash that started the Great Depression.
今天的比率約為 37.0，為歷史第二高；高於引發大蕭條的崩盤之前的水平。
This does not mean the market crashes tomorrow. The CAPE Ratio could go higher. However, it does mean the market is in bubble territory, and no one should be surprised if it does crash.
這並不意味著明天市場會崩盤。 CAPE 比率可能會更高。然而，這確實意味著市場處於泡沫區域，如果它真的崩盤，沒有人應該感到驚訝。
Another widely used metric, more popular than the CAPE Ratio, is the S&P 500 PE Ratio. This ratio is currently around 44.0.
另一個廣泛使用的指標是標準普爾 500 指數市盈率，比 CAPE 比率更受歡迎。該比率目前約為 44.0。
That’s higher than the rallies in the Roaring Twenties, the dot-com bubble, and the rally that preceded the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis.
這高於咆哮的二十年代的反彈、網路泡沫以及 2007 年次貸危機之前的反彈。
Numerous other measures could be used, but they all show similar results. Stocks are at or near all-time highs compared to earnings. That’s indicative of a stock bubble by any definition.
可以使用許多其他措施，但它們都顯示出相似的結果。與收益相比，股票處於或接近歷史高位。從任何定義來看，這都表明存在股票泡沫。
The Bitcoin bubble is an even greater bubble than the stock market. The 630% ramp from $8,900 per coin on May 25, 2020, to $64,830 per coin on April 15, 2021, is one of the most spectacular asset bubbles in history.
比特幣泡沫是比股市更大的泡沫。從 2020 年 5 月 25 日的每枚代幣 8,900 美元飆升至 2021 年 4 月 15 日的每枚代幣 64,830 美元，漲幅為 630%，這是歷史上最壯觀的資產泡沫之一。
If one goes back slightly further to the $210 per coin price on January 20, 2015, the percentage gain is 31,000%. That gain puts the Bitcoin bubble ahead of tulipomania, Beanie Babies, the South Sea Bubble and all of the other investment manias in history.
如果稍微回溯到 2015 年 1 月 20 日每枚硬幣 210 美元的價格，則百分比收益為 31,000%。這一收益使比特幣泡沫領先於鬱金香狂熱、豆豆嬰兒泡沫、南海泡沫和歷史上所有其他投資狂熱。
Bitcoin has struggled lately and trades at around $36,000 today. It’s too soon to say the Bitcoin mania is over, but the fact remains; we’ve been witnessing bubble dynamics in real time.
比特幣最近一直在掙扎，今天的交易價格約為 36,000 美元。現在說比特幣狂熱已經結束還為時過早，但事實仍然存在；我們一直在實時見證泡沫動態。
What about housing?
那麼房市呢？
In real terms (again, adjusted for inflation), Schiller says that housing prices have never been as high as they are today. He uses data going back over 100 years, so that’s pretty remarkable.
席勒說，按實際價值計算（再次根據通貨膨脹進行調整），房價從未像今天這樣高。他使用的數據可以追溯到 100 多年前，所以這非常了不起。
One thing bubbles have in common is that they are driven by their own narrative. What are the narratives that propel today’s bubbles?
泡沫的一個共同點是它們是由自己的敘述驅動的。推動今天泡沫的故事是什麼？
One narrative goes by the name TINA, which stands for There is No Alternative. U.S. bond yields are near all-time lows, so bonds are not attractive compared to stocks even at sky-high stock prices. European stocks have been hammered by back-to-back recessions since the pandemic began.
一種說法叫做 TINA(There is No Alternative)，意旨: “沒有替代品”。美國債券收益率接近歷史最低點，因此即使在股價飆升的情況下，債券與股票相比也不具有吸引力。自病毒大流行開始以來，歐洲股市一直受到連續衰退的打擊。
Gold has mostly moved sideways lately in the absence of inflation. (Inflation expectations have been high, but inflation has not).
在沒有通貨膨脹的情況下，黃金最近大多橫盤整理。 （通脹預期一直很高，但通脹卻沒有）。
Commercial real estate is in distress because of the work-from-home trend and the exodus of talent from major cities due to COVID, crime and riots.
由於在家工作的趨勢以及由於新冠病毒、犯罪和騷亂導致的主要城市人才外流，商業房地產陷入困境。
In short, bonds, gold, foreign stocks and commercial real estate are all unattractive, so investors buy U.S. stocks, Bitcoin and residential real estate because there are no attractive alternatives.
總之，債券、黃金、外國股票和商業地產都沒有吸引力，因此投資者購買美股、比特幣和住宅房地產，因為沒有有吸引力的替代品。
Another narrative has the name FOMO. This stands for Fear of Missing Out. This narrative says stocks, cryptos and residential real estate may be high, but they’re going higher, and if you stand on the sidelines, you’ll miss out on further gains.
另一種敘述的名稱是 FOMO (Fear of Missing Out)。這意旨: “害怕錯過”。這種敘述說股票、加密貨幣和住宅房地產可能很高，但它們正在走高，如果你袖手旁觀，你將錯過進一步的收益。
The third major narrative for the stock market, in particular, is the idea that “You can’t beat the market.” This idea emerged from academia in the 1960s under the names random walk and the efficient markets hypothesis.
特別是股票市場的第三個主要敘述是“你無法擊敗市場”的想法。這個想法在 1960 年代以隨機遊走和有效市場假說的名義從學術界出現。
The random walk hypothesis says that stock prices are inherently unpredictable and whether markets will be higher or lower in the near future is essentially equivalent to a coin toss. The efficient markets hypothesis says that markets continuously incorporate new information and move smoothly to new levels (higher or lower) based on that information.
隨機遊走假設說股票價格本質上是不可預測的，在不久的將來市場是更高還是更低本質上等同於拋硬幣(意旨:賭博)。有效市場假說認為，市場不斷吸收新信息，並根據該信息平穩地移動到新的水平（更高或更低）。
Both the random walk thesis and the efficient markets hypothesis are nonsense and are not supported by empirical evidence. The evidence shows that the time series of stock prices are not random. They move in path-dependent trends with momentum and can be predicted in the intermediate-term with high accuracy.
隨機遊走論和有效市場假設都是無稽之談，沒有經驗證據支持。證據表明，股票價格的時間序列不是隨機的。它們隨著動量以依賴路徑的趨勢移動，並且可以在中期以高精度進行預測。
Markets are not efficient at all. They tend toward bubbles, extreme dips and continually overshoot or undershoot in reaction to the news. Market prices do not move smoothly from one level to another. They gap up or down in huge spikes or dips that leave investors unable to get out of a position before the new level is set.
市場根本沒有效率。他們傾向於泡沫、極度下跌並不斷對新聞做出反應。市場價格不會從一個水平平穩地移動到另一個水平。它們在巨大的高峰或低谷中向上或向下跳空，使投資者無法在新水平設定之前退出頭寸。
And you can beat the market with legal inside information that you develop yourself through proprietary models, expert analysis, or superior information gathering techniques, ranging from polling to satellite imagery.
您可以通過專有模型、專家分析或高級信息收集技術（從民意調查到衛星圖像）自行開發的合法內幕信息來擊敗市場。
But narratives have their own dynamic and do not rely on truth. Some narratives are true, some are not, but it doesn’t matter. They can exert power on markets either way.
但敘事有其自身的動力，並不依賴於真相。有些敘述是真實的，有些則不是，但這並不重要。無論哪種方式，它們都可以對市場施加影響。
If you think that stocks, cryptos and housing are unrelated markets, you may be in for a nasty surprise. These markets seem unlinked when times are good, but severe problems in one market tend to spill over into other markets quickly.
如果您認為股票、加密貨幣和住房是不相關的市場，那麼您可能會大吃一驚。時機好的時候，這些市場似乎沒有聯繫，但一個市場的嚴重問題往往會迅速蔓延到其他市場。
Investors suffering huge losses in cryptos will sell stocks to raise cash. Investors suffering huge losses in stocks may put off buying a new house or even sell their existing home to deleverage. Crashes in one market quickly lead to crashes in other markets because of leverage, liquidity preferences and simple panic.
在加密貨幣方面遭受巨大損失的投資者將出售股票以籌集現金。遭受巨大股票損失的投資者可能會推遲購買新房，甚至出售現有房屋以去槓桿化。由於槓桿、流動性偏好和簡單的恐慌，一個市場的崩潰很快就會導致其他市場的崩潰。
In a market meltdown, you don’t sell what you want; you sell what you can, which often means dumping assets in one market to make up for losses in another. That’s how uncorrelated markets become conditionally correlated in a meltdown.
在市場崩盤中，你賣的不是你想要的；你賣掉你能賣的東西，這通常意味著在一個市場傾銷資產以彌補另一個市場的損失。這就是不相關的市場如何在崩盤中變得有條件地相關。
Again, Shiller is not saying markets will crash tomorrow. Bubbles can go much higher and last much longer than most expect. It’s a bad idea to short bubbles because they may continue far beyond the point at which common sense says they should collapse.
再一次，席勒並不是說明天市場會崩盤。泡沫可以比大多數人預期的要高得多，持續時間也長得多。做空泡沫是一個壞主意，因為它們可能會持續到遠遠超出常識所說的應該崩潰的程度。
Schiller’s only saying they’re exhibiting the kind of melt-up behavior that often precedes a crash, as happened with dot-com stocks in 1999 and the housing market in 2006.
席勒只是說他們正在表現出那種經常在崩盤前出現的熔毀行為，就像 1999 年的互聯網股票和 2006 年的房地產市場一樣。
There may be further gains ahead, but we’re closer to the end than the beginning. Based on Shiller’s advice, it may be time to lighten up on exposure to all three asset classes, even if you don’t get out completely.
未來可能會有進一步的收穫，但我們比開始更接近尾聲。根據席勒的建議，即使您沒有完全退出，也可能是時候減倉對所有三種資產類別的敞口。
Be sure to have plenty of cash in reserve. I also recommend you have 10% of your investable assets in gold.
確保有足夠的現金儲備。我還建議您將 10% 的可投資資產投資於黃金。
Markets may not crash tomorrow. But no one should be surprised if they do. Don’t be caught in the stampede once it happens because you’re probably going to get crushed.
明天市場可能不會崩盤。但如果他們這樣做了，沒有人應該感到驚訝。一旦發生踩踏事件，請不要陷入其中，因為您可能會被壓垮。
Regards,
Jim Rickards
吉姆·里卡茲
Jim Rickards is an American lawyer, economist, and investment banker with 35 years of experience working in capital markets on Wall Street. He was the principal negotiator of the rescue of Long-Term Capital.
吉姆·里卡茲（Jim Rickards）是美國律師，經濟學家和投資銀行家，在華爾街的資本市場工作已有35年的經驗。他是拯救長期資本的首席談判代表。
Shiny黃金白銀交易所
引用: Jim Rickards for Hard Assets Alliance
*文章內容為筆者個人見解，僅供參考。恕不代表本站立場
一次三個泡泡
Jim Rickards 2021/06/07
Dear Reader,
親愛的讀者，
If you’ve ever wondered why you can’t get a straight answer from the Federal Reserve, you’re not alone. And you’re not imagining it.
如果您曾經想知道為什麼不能從美聯儲那裡得到直接答复，那麼您並不孤單。而你並沒有發揮想像。
Beginning with Paul Volcker in the early 1980s and continuing with Alan Greenspan in the 1990s and early 2000s, Fed officials developed a new language called “Fedspeak.”
從 1980 年代初的保羅沃爾克開始，到 1990 年代和 2000 年代初的艾倫格林斯潘，美聯儲官員開發了一種新語言，稱為“聯準說” (“Fedspeak.”)。
Fed governors and chairmen frequently have to testify before Congress, give speeches or do media interviews. They know they have to say something that seems to have substance and is technically correct.
美聯儲理事和主席經常需要在國會作證、發表演講或接受媒體採訪。他們知道他們必須說一些似乎有實質內容並且在技術上是正確的。
On the other hand, they often don’t want to disclose what they actually intend or what they see behind the scenes. Either that or they really don’t know what they’re doing and can’t let people know that.
另一方面，他們通常不想透露他們的實際意圖或他們在幕後看到的內容。要么是那樣，要么他們真的不知道自己在做什麼，也不能讓人們知道。
The way to reconcile these public appearances with as little transparency as possible is to use Fedspeak.
以盡可能低的透明度來調和這些公開露面的方法是使用Fedspeak。
Fedspeak consists of an artful blend of platitudes and jargon that intends to sound intelligent but actually says nothing.
Fedspeak 巧妙地混合了陳詞濫調和行話，聽起來很聰明，但實際上什麼也沒說。
Fedspeak is both confused and confusing. And that’s the point.
Fedspeak既困惑又令人困惑。這就是重點。
Paul Volcker used to practice Fedspeak behind a cloud of smoke from his huge cigar, back when you could smoke indoors. Alan Greenspan later captured the essence of Fedspeak when he testified to Congress, “If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”
保羅沃爾克過去常常在他巨大的雪茄冒出的煙霧後面練習聯邦演講，那時你可以在室內吸煙。艾倫·格林斯潘後來在向國會作證時抓住了 Fedspeak 的精髓，“如果我對你來說似乎過於清楚，你一定誤解了我的話。”
Another bit of candor was when Greenspan said, “We really can’t forecast all that well, and yet we pretend that we can, but we really can’t.” (It’s a mystery to me why many people actually place credence in their forecasts).
另一種坦率是格林斯潘說：“我們真的不能預測那麼好，但我們假裝可以，但我們真的不能。”（對我來說，為什麼許多人真的相信他們的預測是個謎）。
Fedspeak may have been invented by Volcker and Greenspan, but it’s alive and well today. The latest example comes from Fed Vice Chairman Randy Quarles while testifying before Congress on the possibility of inflation due to Fed policies of zero rates and huge asset purchases.
Fedspeak 可能是由沃爾克和格林斯潘發明的，但它在今天仍然有效。最新的例子來自美聯儲副主席蘭迪·誇爾斯 (Randy Quarles)，他在國會作證時指出，由於美聯儲的零利率和巨額資產購買政策可能導致通脹。
Quarles first says, “I don’t want to overstate my concern” about inflation, and adds that he does not expect a breakout. He then pivots and says, “If my expectations about…inflation…are borne out…and especially if they come in strong…it will become important…to begin discussing our plans to adjust the pace of asset purchases.”
誇爾斯首先說，“我不想誇大我對通脹的擔憂”，並補充說他預計不會出現大爆發。然後他轉過頭來說：“如果我對……通貨膨脹的預期……得到證實……尤其是如果它們變得強勁……這將變得很重要……開始討論我們調整資產購買步伐的計劃。”
In other words, we may be getting close to a new “taper” and a possible taper tantrum. So, which is it? Inflation or no inflation? Quarles says both and, therefore, really says nothing of substance.
換句話說，我們可能正在接近一個新的“減低購買”和一個可能的縮表恐慌。那麼，它是哪個？通貨膨脹還是不通貨膨脹？ Quarles 兩者都說了，因此，實際上什麼也沒說。
A perfect example of Fedspeak.
又是Fedspeak 的一個完美例子。
What is clear is that the Fed has become a serial bubble machine that has dangerously distorted the entire financial system through constant intervention, which greatly increased during the pandemic.
顯而易見的是，美聯儲已經成為一個連續的泡沫機器，通過不斷的干預，危險地扭曲了整個金融體系，在大流行期間大大增加了。
Right now, it has created not one, not two, but three simultaneous bubbles. What are they? And how much longer can they last before imploding? Read on.
現在，它創造的不是一個，不是兩個，而是三個同時出現的泡沫。這些是什麼？它們在爆炸之前還能持續多久？繼續閱讀。
The Fed’s Inflated Three Simultaneous Bubbles
美聯儲同時膨脹的三個泡沫
I don’t hold many mainstream economists in high regard. They mostly cling to obsolete or defective models (such as random walk, efficient markets hypothesis, Phillips Curve, wealth effect, and many more). They are also impervious to contrary data, alternative models, and common sense.
我對許多主流經濟學家的評價並不高。他們大多堅持過時或有缺陷的模型（例如隨機遊走、有效市場假設、菲利普斯曲線、財富效應等等）。它們也不受相反數據、替代模型和常識的影響。
But, one of the few mainstream economists whose work I follow closely is Robert Shiller, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2013.
但是，我密切關注工作的少數主流經濟學家之一是 2013 年諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者羅伯特·席勒 (Robert Shiller)。
Shiller is a true pragmatist. He develops models that reflect reality rather than creating abstract models and forcing data to fit some preconceived and erroneous curve. He has also developed metrics such as the Case-Shiller home price index and the CAPE Ratio to track price movements and potential bubbles in key asset classes.
席勒是一位真正的實用主義者。他開發反映現實的模型，而不是創建抽像模型並強迫數據擬合一些先入為主的錯誤曲線。他還開發了 Case-Shiller 房價指數和 CAPE 比率等指標，以跟踪關鍵資產類別的價格走勢和潛在泡沫。
And right now, Shiller is issuing one of his most dramatic warnings ever...
而現在，席勒發出了他有史以來最具戲劇性的警告之一……
Shiller is warning that stocks, housing and cryptos may all be in extreme bubbles at the same time.
席勒警告說，股票、房地產和加密貨幣可能同時處於極度泡沫之中。
Shiller uses data series that go back over 100 years in some cases, so he has a deep perspective on business cycles and prior bubbles on which to base his forecast. Savvy investors are well-advised to follow Shiller and be alert to his warnings.
在某些情況下，席勒使用可以追溯到 100 多年前的數據系列，因此他對商業周期和之前的泡沫有著深刻的見解，以此作為他的預測的基礎。明智的投資者最好跟隨席勒並警惕他的警告。
There’s no doubt that U.S. stock markets are in bubble territory.
毫無疑問，美國股市處於泡沫區域。
One of the best metrics in terms of predictive analytic power is the Shiller Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio, known as the CAPE Ratio.
就預測分析能力而言，最好的指標之一是席勒週期性調整市盈率，稱為 CAPE 比率。
The CAPE Ratio uses a price-to-earnings ratio (PE ratio) similar to many other PE ratios in use. The main difference is that the CAPE Ratio uses earnings per share (EPS) averaged over ten years and adjusted for inflation.
CAPE 比率使用的市盈率（PE 比率）與使用的許多其他市盈率相似。主要區別在於 CAPE 比率使用的是過去十年的平均每股收益 (EPS)，並根據通貨膨脹進行了調整。
These adjustments smooth out earnings through an entire business cycle (with a ten-year average) and present real earnings (with the inflation adjustment).
這些調整使整個商業周期的收益（十年平均值）平滑並呈現實際收益（通貨膨脹調整）。
The all-time high CAPE Ratio was 44.19 in December 1999 at the peak of the dot-com bubble. The ratio was 30.0 immediately prior to the historic stock market crash of October 1929.
1999 年 12 月互聯網泡沫達到頂峰時，CAPE 比率創下歷史新高的 44.19。在 1929 年 10 月曆史性股市崩盤之前，該比率為 30.0。
Today the ratio is about 37.0, the second-highest in history; higher than it was before the crash that started the Great Depression.
今天的比率約為 37.0，為歷史第二高；高於引發大蕭條的崩盤之前的水平。
This does not mean the market crashes tomorrow. The CAPE Ratio could go higher. However, it does mean the market is in bubble territory, and no one should be surprised if it does crash.
這並不意味著明天市場會崩盤。 CAPE 比率可能會更高。然而，這確實意味著市場處於泡沫區域，如果它真的崩盤，沒有人應該感到驚訝。
Another widely used metric, more popular than the CAPE Ratio, is the S&P 500 PE Ratio. This ratio is currently around 44.0.
另一個廣泛使用的指標是標準普爾 500 指數市盈率，比 CAPE 比率更受歡迎。該比率目前約為 44.0。
That’s higher than the rallies in the Roaring Twenties, the dot-com bubble, and the rally that preceded the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis.
這高於咆哮的二十年代的反彈、網路泡沫以及 2007 年次貸危機之前的反彈。
Numerous other measures could be used, but they all show similar results. Stocks are at or near all-time highs compared to earnings. That’s indicative of a stock bubble by any definition.
可以使用許多其他措施，但它們都顯示出相似的結果。與收益相比，股票處於或接近歷史高位。從任何定義來看，這都表明存在股票泡沫。
The Bitcoin bubble is an even greater bubble than the stock market. The 630% ramp from $8,900 per coin on May 25, 2020, to $64,830 per coin on April 15, 2021, is one of the most spectacular asset bubbles in history.
比特幣泡沫是比股市更大的泡沫。從 2020 年 5 月 25 日的每枚代幣 8,900 美元飆升至 2021 年 4 月 15 日的每枚代幣 64,830 美元，漲幅為 630%，這是歷史上最壯觀的資產泡沫之一。
If one goes back slightly further to the $210 per coin price on January 20, 2015, the percentage gain is 31,000%. That gain puts the Bitcoin bubble ahead of tulipomania, Beanie Babies, the South Sea Bubble and all of the other investment manias in history.
如果稍微回溯到 2015 年 1 月 20 日每枚硬幣 210 美元的價格，則百分比收益為 31,000%。這一收益使比特幣泡沫領先於鬱金香狂熱、豆豆嬰兒泡沫、南海泡沫和歷史上所有其他投資狂熱。
Bitcoin has struggled lately and trades at around $36,000 today. It’s too soon to say the Bitcoin mania is over, but the fact remains; we’ve been witnessing bubble dynamics in real time.
比特幣最近一直在掙扎，今天的交易價格約為 36,000 美元。現在說比特幣狂熱已經結束還為時過早，但事實仍然存在；我們一直在實時見證泡沫動態。
What about housing?
那麼房市呢？
In real terms (again, adjusted for inflation), Schiller says that housing prices have never been as high as they are today. He uses data going back over 100 years, so that’s pretty remarkable.
席勒說，按實際價值計算（再次根據通貨膨脹進行調整），房價從未像今天這樣高。他使用的數據可以追溯到 100 多年前，所以這非常了不起。
One thing bubbles have in common is that they are driven by their own narrative. What are the narratives that propel today’s bubbles?
泡沫的一個共同點是它們是由自己的敘述驅動的。推動今天泡沫的故事是什麼？
One narrative goes by the name TINA, which stands for There is No Alternative. U.S. bond yields are near all-time lows, so bonds are not attractive compared to stocks even at sky-high stock prices. European stocks have been hammered by back-to-back recessions since the pandemic began.
一種說法叫做 TINA(There is No Alternative)，意旨: “沒有替代品”。美國債券收益率接近歷史最低點，因此即使在股價飆升的情況下，債券與股票相比也不具有吸引力。自病毒大流行開始以來，歐洲股市一直受到連續衰退的打擊。
Gold has mostly moved sideways lately in the absence of inflation. (Inflation expectations have been high, but inflation has not).
在沒有通貨膨脹的情況下，黃金最近大多橫盤整理。 （通脹預期一直很高，但通脹卻沒有）。
Commercial real estate is in distress because of the work-from-home trend and the exodus of talent from major cities due to COVID, crime and riots.
由於在家工作的趨勢以及由於新冠病毒、犯罪和騷亂導致的主要城市人才外流，商業房地產陷入困境。
In short, bonds, gold, foreign stocks and commercial real estate are all unattractive, so investors buy U.S. stocks, Bitcoin and residential real estate because there are no attractive alternatives.
總之，債券、黃金、外國股票和商業地產都沒有吸引力，因此投資者購買美股、比特幣和住宅房地產，因為沒有有吸引力的替代品。
Another narrative has the name FOMO. This stands for Fear of Missing Out. This narrative says stocks, cryptos and residential real estate may be high, but they’re going higher, and if you stand on the sidelines, you’ll miss out on further gains.
另一種敘述的名稱是 FOMO (Fear of Missing Out)。這意旨: “害怕錯過”。這種敘述說股票、加密貨幣和住宅房地產可能很高，但它們正在走高，如果你袖手旁觀，你將錯過進一步的收益。
The third major narrative for the stock market, in particular, is the idea that “You can’t beat the market.” This idea emerged from academia in the 1960s under the names random walk and the efficient markets hypothesis.
特別是股票市場的第三個主要敘述是“你無法擊敗市場”的想法。這個想法在 1960 年代以隨機遊走和有效市場假說的名義從學術界出現。
The random walk hypothesis says that stock prices are inherently unpredictable and whether markets will be higher or lower in the near future is essentially equivalent to a coin toss. The efficient markets hypothesis says that markets continuously incorporate new information and move smoothly to new levels (higher or lower) based on that information.
隨機遊走假設說股票價格本質上是不可預測的，在不久的將來市場是更高還是更低本質上等同於拋硬幣(意旨:賭博)。有效市場假說認為，市場不斷吸收新信息，並根據該信息平穩地移動到新的水平（更高或更低）。
Both the random walk thesis and the efficient markets hypothesis are nonsense and are not supported by empirical evidence. The evidence shows that the time series of stock prices are not random. They move in path-dependent trends with momentum and can be predicted in the intermediate-term with high accuracy.
隨機遊走論和有效市場假設都是無稽之談，沒有經驗證據支持。證據表明，股票價格的時間序列不是隨機的。它們隨著動量以依賴路徑的趨勢移動，並且可以在中期以高精度進行預測。
Markets are not efficient at all. They tend toward bubbles, extreme dips and continually overshoot or undershoot in reaction to the news. Market prices do not move smoothly from one level to another. They gap up or down in huge spikes or dips that leave investors unable to get out of a position before the new level is set.
市場根本沒有效率。他們傾向於泡沫、極度下跌並不斷對新聞做出反應。市場價格不會從一個水平平穩地移動到另一個水平。它們在巨大的高峰或低谷中向上或向下跳空，使投資者無法在新水平設定之前退出頭寸。
And you can beat the market with legal inside information that you develop yourself through proprietary models, expert analysis, or superior information gathering techniques, ranging from polling to satellite imagery.
您可以通過專有模型、專家分析或高級信息收集技術（從民意調查到衛星圖像）自行開發的合法內幕信息來擊敗市場。
But narratives have their own dynamic and do not rely on truth. Some narratives are true, some are not, but it doesn’t matter. They can exert power on markets either way.
但敘事有其自身的動力，並不依賴於真相。有些敘述是真實的，有些則不是，但這並不重要。無論哪種方式，它們都可以對市場施加影響。
If you think that stocks, cryptos and housing are unrelated markets, you may be in for a nasty surprise. These markets seem unlinked when times are good, but severe problems in one market tend to spill over into other markets quickly.
如果您認為股票、加密貨幣和住房是不相關的市場，那麼您可能會大吃一驚。時機好的時候，這些市場似乎沒有聯繫，但一個市場的嚴重問題往往會迅速蔓延到其他市場。
Investors suffering huge losses in cryptos will sell stocks to raise cash. Investors suffering huge losses in stocks may put off buying a new house or even sell their existing home to deleverage. Crashes in one market quickly lead to crashes in other markets because of leverage, liquidity preferences and simple panic.
在加密貨幣方面遭受巨大損失的投資者將出售股票以籌集現金。遭受巨大股票損失的投資者可能會推遲購買新房，甚至出售現有房屋以去槓桿化。由於槓桿、流動性偏好和簡單的恐慌，一個市場的崩潰很快就會導致其他市場的崩潰。
In a market meltdown, you don’t sell what you want; you sell what you can, which often means dumping assets in one market to make up for losses in another. That’s how uncorrelated markets become conditionally correlated in a meltdown.
在市場崩盤中，你賣的不是你想要的；你賣掉你能賣的東西，這通常意味著在一個市場傾銷資產以彌補另一個市場的損失。這就是不相關的市場如何在崩盤中變得有條件地相關。
Again, Shiller is not saying markets will crash tomorrow. Bubbles can go much higher and last much longer than most expect. It’s a bad idea to short bubbles because they may continue far beyond the point at which common sense says they should collapse.
再一次，席勒並不是說明天市場會崩盤。泡沫可以比大多數人預期的要高得多，持續時間也長得多。做空泡沫是一個壞主意，因為它們可能會持續到遠遠超出常識所說的應該崩潰的程度。
Schiller’s only saying they’re exhibiting the kind of melt-up behavior that often precedes a crash, as happened with dot-com stocks in 1999 and the housing market in 2006.
席勒只是說他們正在表現出那種經常在崩盤前出現的熔毀行為，就像 1999 年的互聯網股票和 2006 年的房地產市場一樣。
There may be further gains ahead, but we’re closer to the end than the beginning. Based on Shiller’s advice, it may be time to lighten up on exposure to all three asset classes, even if you don’t get out completely.
未來可能會有進一步的收穫，但我們比開始更接近尾聲。根據席勒的建議，即使您沒有完全退出，也可能是時候減倉對所有三種資產類別的敞口。
Be sure to have plenty of cash in reserve. I also recommend you have 10% of your investable assets in gold.
確保有足夠的現金儲備。我還建議您將 10% 的可投資資產投資於黃金。
Markets may not crash tomorrow. But no one should be surprised if they do. Don’t be caught in the stampede once it happens because you’re probably going to get crushed.
明天市場可能不會崩盤。但如果他們這樣做了，沒有人應該感到驚訝。一旦發生踩踏事件，請不要陷入其中，因為您可能會被壓垮。
Regards,
Jim Rickards
吉姆·里卡茲
Jim Rickards is an American lawyer, economist, and investment banker with 35 years of experience working in capital markets on Wall Street. He was the principal negotiator of the rescue of Long-Term Capital.
吉姆·里卡茲（Jim Rickards）是美國律師，經濟學家和投資銀行家，在華爾街的資本市場工作已有35年的經驗。他是拯救長期資本的首席談判代表。
Shiny黃金白銀交易所
引用: Jim Rickards for Hard Assets Alliance
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